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The United States long ago recog-
nized the fact that the only true 
security in the world today is collec-
tive security. In furtherance of this 
concept, the United States has entered 
into many alliances with other nations 
of the free world in order to protect 
itself as well as assist in the protection 
of these friendly countries. One such 
alliance is the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization. And, as a part of our 
contribution to this partnership, we 
have stationed a sizable number of our 
military forces in Europe. In other 
friendly countries throughout the world 
our armed forces are assigned in more 
limited numbers. This is the first time in 
history that in time of peace military 
forces of the United States have been 
assigned to foreign areas for an indefi-
nite period of time. 
The understanding with each country 
in which our forces are stationed in-
cludes specific arrangements with re-
spect to jurisdiction over these forces. 
All told, there are approximately 60 
countries with which the United States 
has some type of jurisdictional arrange-
ment regarding American servicemen 
stationed within their borders. 
It is my purpose to consider the 
provision of these agreements which 
relates to the authority of the host state 
and the military authorities of the send-
ing state to exercise jurisdiction over 
offenses committed by members of the 
visiting force within the territory of the 
host state. This phase of the relationship 
between our forces and the host state is 
the most controversial. It has received 
the greatest amount of publicity and is 
of prime interest to commanding offi-
cers. 
Before considering the division of 
jurisdictional authority established by 
these agreements, however, it may be 
helpful first to see what would be the 
status of our service personnel abroad in 
the absence of any agreements. 
A sovereign nation exercises absolute 
and exclusive jurisdiction within its own 
territory. If the commander of a visiting 
friendly military force convenes a court-
martial to try a subordinate for some 
purely military offense, such as failure 
to obey the lawful order of a superior 
officer, the commander impinges upon 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the sover-
eign. 
Yet, the maintenance of discipline 
within a military force is recognized as 
the inherent responsibility and duty of 
the commander. In order to overcome 
this impasse, and at the same time 
preserve the integrity of both of these 
principles, International Law recognized 
the further proposition that where a 
sovereign permits a friendly foreign mili-
tary force to enter his territory, he 
implicitly waives jurisdiction over the 
force with respect to matters of military 
discipline. This implied immunity is 
strictly construed and extends only to 
the right to discipline and punish as may 
be required for the government of the 
force. Whatever may be their acceptance 
in many law texts, however, the hard 
fact of today's international situation is 
that such broader exceptions are not 
accepted in our world of rising national-
istic feelings. 
This state of the law may come as a 
surprise to some who recall that during 
World War II we exercised exclusive 
jurisdiction over our armed forces 
wherever they were situated. In point of 
fact, we exercised exclusive jurisdiction 
during the war years solely as the result 
of wartime agreements that reflected 
wartime requirements and the relative 
circumstances of the parties at the time 
of negotiation. 
Most of the agreements in force 
today were negotiated in time of peace 
to meet peacetime requirements. They 
vary all the way from granting exclusive 
jurisdiction to the United States in a 
few instances, such as in Korea, Green-
land, and Ethiopia, to the establishment 
of a system of concurrent jurisdiction, 
such as in Bermuda, the Bahamas, and 
the NATO countries. In general, the 
type of jurisdiction which is granted to 
the United States is largely dependent 
upon the mission of the force assigned, 
its size, the laws of the host country and 
the willingness of the host country to 
waive its jurisdiction in favor of the 
United States. There are no agreements 
by which a foreign state exercises exclu-
sive jurisdiction over our forces. 
Under the circumstances, it would be 
error to say that in completing these 
jurisdictional arrangements the United 
States Government has surrendered any 
rights of the American serviceman who 
is stationed abroad. On the other hand, 
it can be said that every agreement 
which has been negotiated amounts to a 
specific gain for our service personnel 
abroad. 
In many countries there may be 
more than one category of our forces, 
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each categGry being present by virtue of 
a different agreement and, therefore, 
each being in a different jurisdictional 
status. 
Under the mutual defense assistance 
agreements, the personnel assigned to 
the MAAG units enjoy the same im-
munity as embassy personnel of corre-
sponding rank. 
The agreements that establish the 
various military and naval missions pro-
vide that personnel aflsigned to this duty 
will remain subject to United States 
military law and only in some instances 
subject to local jurisdiction. 
Personnel serving in the Ryukyus are 
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
United States, due to the fact that we 
exercise control over the area. 
Most of our forces stationed abroad 
are a part of the, NATO Defensive 
Organization and are serving in the 
various countries which are members of 
the NATO alliance. The status of these 
forces is controlled by the Status of 
Forces Agreement, a multilateral con-
vention entered into by all of the 
signatories of the NATO alliance with 
the exception of Iceland, which does 
not maintain an armed force of its own. 
This agreement was negotiated in 1951, 
and ratified by the Senate of the United 
States in 1953. It is by far the most 
important convention relating to the 
status of our forces abroad. 
This convention superseded many 
bilateral agreements which had previ-
ously controlled the status of forces 
among the NATO countries. It estab-
lishes uniformity in relations between 
the member of a force, the civilian 
components, and their dependents, with 
the authorities of the receiving state, 
and it clarifies and broadens the right of 
the sending state to exercise jurisdiction 
over its own forces. 
The major concept of this arrange-
ment is the establishment of concurrent 
jurisdiction with a scheme designed to 
divide the exercise of jurisdiction be-
tween the authorities of the sending 
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state and the host state, based upon the 
principle of primary interest. 
The military authorities of the 
sending state are given the primary right 
to exercise jurisdiction over a member 
of a force or civilian component when 
the offense involves the property of the 
sending state or the person or property 
of a member of the force, a civilian 
component of the sending state or a 
dependent, or the offense arises out of 
the performance of official duties. In all 
other cases the receiving state has pri-
mary jurisdiction. 
It may be appropriate at this point to 
invite your attention to the status of 
dependents under this jurisdictional 
arrangement. While the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice places dependents 
within the category of persons who are 
subject to military law when accom-
panying our forces abroad and the 
status of forces agreement gives to the 
military authorities of the sending state 
the authority to exercise all criminal 
and disciplinary jurisdiction authorized 
by the laws of their own state, the 
agreement reserves to the host state 
primary jurisdiction over offenses com-
mitted by dependents. 
One of the important features of the 
status of forces arrangement is the 
official duty determination, which con-
trols in a great many cases whether the 
military commander or the authorities 
of the host state shall have primary 
jurisdiction. Two aspects of this provi-
sion are worthy of note: namely, what 
is to be the definition of official duty, 
and who will make the decision. The 
agreement answers neither question, 
although it would appear from the 
working papers of those who drafted 
the agreement that it was intended that 
the military authorities of the sending 
state make the decision. This is the 
position urged by the United States, 
although it has not been accepted by all 
of the signatories. For instance, in the 
United Kingdom, British Courts make 
the final decision in official duty 
questions. Substantially the same prac-
tices are followed in Japan and Turkey. 
In all other NATO countries, however, 
the determination of the official duty 
question by the authorities of the 
visiting force appears to be final. 
You may be interested in a recent 
development in Turkey. The Turkish 
courts have been construing the phrase 
"In performance of official duty" far 
stricter than United States authorities, 
with the result that Turkey was prose-
cuting cases which our military com-
manders considered to be official duty 
cases. The difficulty was found to lie in 
the fact that in translating this phrase 
into Turkish it acquired a more limited 
meaning. As a solution, Turkey enacted 
a law authorizing an interpretation 
which would include an offense com-
mitted ''In connection with the per-
formance of official duty." One of the 
immediate results of this change was the 
release to the Army for trial by court-
martial of a sergeant, who was being 
held for trial for a traffic death which 
occurred while he was driving a govern-
ment vehicle on temporary duty. 
Another important feature of the 
agreement provides that the state having 
the primary right to exercise jurisdiction 
shall give sympathetic consideration to 
a request from the authorities of the 
other state that jurisdiction be waived in 
its favor. It is the policy of the United 
States to request a waiver in every case 
in which it does not have primary 
jurisdiction. Also, it is the policy of the 
United States not to waive jurisdiction 
in any case in which it has primary 
jurisdiction. Our military authorities 
have been successful in securing a waiver 
by the host state of primary right in a 
great number of cases. It may be said 
that in most instances the host state is 
willing to waive its right except where 
the offense is one which arouses public 
indignation or grossly offends morals or 
national pride. 
In a supplemental exchange of notes 
with the Netherlands, that state agreed 
to waive primary jurisdiction except 
where it is determined that an offense is 
of particular importance to the Nether-
lands authorities. Under this arrange-
ment, we are given the right to act in 
substantially all cases involving persons 
subject to military law. This is known as 
the "Netherlands Formula," and has 
been adopted with respect to our forces 
in other countries. 
The right to request a waiver is 
particularly important in the case of 
dependents. As noted earlier, the pri-
mary right to exercise jurisdiction over 
dependents rests with the host state. 
Thus, a dependent is in somewhat the 
same status as a tourist, and upon the 
commission of an offense will be tried 
by the courts of the receiving state 
unless jurisdiction is waived. It might be 
added in passing that service personnel 
and members of civilian components are 
also in the status of tourists when in a 
leave status in a country other than the 
one in which they are stationed unless 
there is some special understanding with 
that country. 
Whether a case involves the question 
of official duty or the waiver of primary 
jurisdiction by the host state, the 
administrative steps required to protect 
the interests of the accused must be 
promptly and effectively pursued, be-
ginning with the immediate com-
manding officer and extending all the 
way to the highest authority who deals 
with the foreign office on the govern-
ment level. Our experience in gaining 
the right to try such a large number of 
cases in which the receiving states have 
had the primary right is due to effective 
administration at all levels and the 
general feeling of mutual respect and 
fair dealing that typifies the relations 
between our forces and the officials of 
the host countries. I do not believe that 
the importance of maintaining such 
amiable relationship can be overempha-
sized. 
Without attempting to burden you 
with statistics, let me indicate the 
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degree of success we are having by 
giving you a few figures just received 
from Japan. For the six months' period 
ending 1 June 1956, there were 2,675 
offenses committed by United States 
personnel subject to Japanese jurisdic-
tion. A waiver was received in 2,610 
cases-of the remaining, 44 have been 
tried-16 were sentenced to confine-
ment, but only 4 were sentenced to 
confinement unsuspended. 
The NATO countries have agreed 
that the authorities of both the sending 
and the receiving states shall assist each 
other in arresting members of a force, 
civilian component or dependents in the 
territory of the receiving state, and in 
handing them over to the authority 
which is to exercise jurisdiction. 
This provision is of particular interest 
to the Navy, since a ship when in a port 
of a foreign country physically is within 
the territory of that country, notwith-
standing the fiction of extraterritoriality 
which is traditionally applied to men-
of-war when visiting foreign ports. 
Normally, treaty provisions prevail over 
general principles of International Law, 
and we find this rule to apply in this 
case. 
Thus, where a naval ship is in the 
port of a NATO country and a member 
of the crew is charged by local authori-
ties with the commission of an offense 
over which they have the right to 
exercise primary jurisdiction, the com-
manding officer, upon the request of 
local authorities, may be required by 
the agreement to deliver up the accused. 
In other words, such a case would be 
handled in the same fashion as though 
the accused were based ashore. 
In contrast with the requirement in 
NATO ports, let us consider the status 
of a crew member of a vessel of war in 
the port of a country not a member of 
NATO. In accordance with the ex-
territorial status of the ship a member 
of the crew when he returns to his ship 
becomes immune from arrest by local 
authorities so long as he remains on 
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hoard; and his commanding officer is 
not authorized to alter this status. If the 
foreign authorities desire custody of 
such a crew memher, they must proceed 
through diplomatic channels. 
Now let us consider an actual case 
involving this question. 
Within the past year a destroyer 
made a recreational visit to an island 
helonging to a friendly power. There 
was no agreement hetween the United 
States and this power relative to the 
surrender of personnel and there was 
concurrent jurisdiction over any of-
fenses committed ashore hy memhers of 
the cre~v. John Doe, a memher of the 
destroyer's crew, was alleged to have 
assaulted one of the local uniformed 
customs officials. The next day, amid 
considerahle confusion and local pres-
sures hrought ahout hy an acute local 
political situation, the commanding offi-
cer turned John Doe over to the local 
authorities with the understanding that 
it was solely for the purposes of identifi-
cation and questioning and that Doe 
would he returned to his ship on com-
pletion of the interview. But Doe ended 
up hehind the hars of the local jail, the 
local officillls refused to surrender 
custody, and the ship was required to 
sail leaving Doe hehind. There were no 
United States military activities in the 
island. 
Three weeks later, after some two 
dozen messages, the employment of two 
local attorneys, the return to the island 
of two officers and seven enlisted men 
from the ship on TAD to testify for the 
defense, two trials, a six-month sentence 
to confinement, which was reduced to a 
$126 fine, and the expenditure of some 
$1,200 in Doe's defense, which was 
raised from among the American resi-
dents in the island, the fine was paid 
and John Doe was returned to the 
United States hy commercial air at 
government expense. Suhsequently, the 
Navy Department reimhursed all who 
had contrihuted to the defense fund. 
And now for the final chapter of this 
story. According to the investigation 
conducted hy the ship, it was actually a 
case of mistakt;n identity. 
In view of the importance of this 
jurisdictional question and the many 
different situations that may he en-
countered due to differing treaty provi-
sions in some instances, and the absence 
of treaty arrangements in others, with 
the risk of being a hit repetitious, let me 
quickly restate the general guidelines on 
this point. 
In countries where we do have a 
treaty or agreement pertaining to 
criminal jurisdiction over personnel of 
the naval forces, such as a status of 
forces agreement, an ohligation may 
exist which will require a commanding 
officer to turn.a suspected serviceman 
over to local authorities for possible 
prosecution in the foreign courts. 
In countries where we do not have 
treaties or agreements regarding the 
exercise of criminal jurisdiction over 
personnel in our naval forces, the 
general rule of International Law 
applies. That law specifies that where 
personnel are ashore for liberty or rec-
reation they come under the jurisdiction 
of the foreign country, and they can 
therefore he tried in local courts. How-
ever, such jurisdiction can only he exer-
cised when the foreign country also has 
custody or physical control over the 
suspected person. 
Where we do not have treaty com-
mitments and an offense has been com-
mitted within the foreign territory hut 
the suspect has returned to his ship, the 
situation is different. In this case, if the 
foreign state desires to exercise its juris-
diction it must press its claim for 
delivery of the suspect through diplo-
matic channels. 
The status of forces agreement has 
heen criticized in some quarters for 
allegedly doing away with the constitu-
tional protection which our service per-
sonnel have in this country. Such an 
approach seems to he in step with the 
proposition that the constitution 
follows the flag-a view no longer con-
sidered tenable. As a matter of fact, this 
agreement introduced for the first time 
provisions wherehy the receiving state 
undertook to guarantee certain specific 
rights to members of the visiting forces 
accused of an offense before a foreign 
court. These guaranteed rights are: The 
right to a prompt and speedy trial; the 
right to he informed in advance of trial 
of the specific charges against him; the 
right to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses; the right to be 
confronted with the witnesses against 
him; the right to have legal representa-
tion of his own choice, and the services 
of an interpreter; and the right to 
communicate with a representative of 
his own government. 
Steps have he en taken to insure that 
these rights are made available to service 
personnel. The resolution of the Senate 
of the United States, in ratifying the 
status of forces agreement, imposed 
upon the armed services specific respon-
sibilities aimed at insuring fully to each 
serviceman subject to foreign trial all of 
the rights guaranteed him by the agree-
ment. 
It is required that a "designated" 
commanding officer be appointed for 
each country where a force is stationed, 
whose duty it is to supervise the opera-
tion of this jurisdictional arrangement 
wihin his area; to complete a study of 
local criminal law and procedure; and, 
when a serviceman is an accused hefore 
a foreign court, to request through 
diplomatic channels a waiver of jurisdic-
tion or release from custody in any case 
where it is considered that he will not 
receive a fair trial, or fair treatment 
before or after trial. 
He must designate an observer to 
attend the trial of each accused. This 
observer must be a lawyer in all but 
minor cases, and he must submit a 
written report to the designated com-
manding officer and the Judge Advocate 
General of the accused's service. 
Legislation passed at the last session 
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of Congress authorized the military de-
partments to employ counsel, pay coun-
sel fees, court costs, and to furnish bail 
in any case where a person subject to 
military law is an accused before a 
foreign court. 
Resolving questions relating to the 
exercise of criminal jurisdiction is not 
all that is involved in the relationship 
between service personnel and the host 
state. The very presence of a visiting 
force in a foreign state, in many cases 
with accompanying dependents and for 
indefinite periods, has an impact upon 
the economic, social and cultural pat-
tern of the local population. The result 
is somewhat the same as that ex-
perienced in communities within the 
United States when military or naval 
activities are established within their 
midst for the first time. 
The status of forces agreement has 
undertaken to meet these circumstances 
by providing the members of the ~isiting 
force with immunity from local laws, 
taxation and customs regulations in 
keeping with their temporary status, 
and by imposing upon the members of 
the force a civil responsibility in keeping 
with the needs of the local community. 
A great number of the nonmilitary 
offenses committed hy our personnel 
abroad involve incidents in which per-
sonal injury or property damage is 
sustained by third persons. A speedy 
and fair settlement of claims growing 
out of such incidents gives great assis-
tance to our efforts to obtain a waiver 
of jurisdiction by the host state. All too 
often the determination of the local 
authorities to exercise their jurisdiction 
may be traced to the pressure brought 
to hear on hehalf of an injured claimant, 
who is unhappy over an apparent delay 
in making restitution for the wrong he 
has suffered. Such a claim may be one 
for which the sending state has a legal 
responsibility, as when the injury was 
caused by a member of the force while 
in the performance of an official duty. 
Or, the claim may be one for which 
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there is no legal responsibility and 
which is considered and settled gratui-
tously by the sending state. Claims of 
the first category are investigated and 
paid ~y the host state on the basis of 
the law of the host state. The cost of 
such settlement is borne 75 per cent by 
the sending state and 25 per cent by the 
host state. In the latter category of 
claims the host state investigates and 
evaluates the claim and then informs the 
sending state of the amount it considers 
appropriate should the sending state 
desire to make an ex gratia settlement. 
It is true that from the military or 
naval Commander's point of view the 
ideal jurisdictional arrangement would 
be to have complete and exclusive juris-
diction over all personnel attached to 
and accompanying his command over-
seas. From a practical point of view, 
however, this is impossible. We have 
seen that International Law gives no 
such right to a military commander in 
the absence of an agreement to that 
effect with the host nation. We are 
therefore required to rely upon conces-
sions obtained by agreements with the 
nations where our forces are stationed 
or may otherwise be present. 
The NATO Status of Forces Agree-
ment is the key agreement in this 
respect. Its terms were agreed to only 
after lengthy and careful negotiation, 
and represent the maximum concessions 
in jurisdiction that NATO receiving 
states were willing to surrender to send-
ing states in a multilateral treaty. Its 
proVIsIons govern the status of larger 
members of our military personnel more 
than any other single agreement, and its 
terms have been stated to represent the 
minimum jurisdictional standards which 
are acceptable to the Congress and 
Department of Defense. The problem 
has not been laid to rest, however, for 
our military and diplomatic officials 
consistently have sought wherever pos-
sible, by additional bilateral agreements 
and by informal working arrangements, 
to obtain even greater jurisdictional 
concessions. 
As a result of these arrangements, the 
jurisdiction exercised in actual practice 
by United States military authorities is 
in excess of that to be found in the 
basic NATO SOF Formula in practically 
every country in which we have forces 
assigned. In reporting to the Senate on 
the experience of our armed forces 
under the Status of Forces Agreement, 
Senator Ervin stated that the jurisdic-
tion arrangements regarding our forces 
abroad have not adversely affected 
morale and discipline of our personnel 
nor have they interfered with the 
accomplishment of our military mis-
sions in those. c_ountries. This success 
may be credited to the recogniton by 
the authorities of the United States and 
the host nations of a mutual respon-
sibility in this undertaking and to our 
interest in the military man as an 
individual and our dedication to the 
protection and preservation of his rights 
to the best of our ability. 
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